Stephen Frisby

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Release: May 2, 2025

On May 2, 2025, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued eight opinions. Below is a brief summary of each opinion.

Christopher Sandon Ramirez v. State of Alabama (CR-2023-0282) – Per Curiam – Reversed and Remanded after Remand from the Alabama Supreme Court

  • Facts: Christopher Sandon Ramirez was convicted in the Montgomery Circuit Court for DUI and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Alabama Supreme Court had previously reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals’ initial affirmance, holding that the appellate court erred in finding Ramirez had waived his right to argue that the State failed to provide the required statutory notice (under § 12-21-301, Ala. Code 1975) of its intent to use a certificate of analysis in lieu of direct testimony at his trial de novo. The case was remanded to the Court of Criminal Appeals to review this claim. It was undisputed that the State did not provide the required 40-day written notice. 
  • Holding: The Court of Criminal Appeals, following the Alabama Supreme Court’s directive, reviewed Ramirez’s claim regarding the State’s failure to provide notice. The Court found that the admission of the certificate of analysis without the statutorily required notice was not harmless, especially since the certificate was the most direct, independent proof of the corpus delicti of the DUI charge (ingestion of methamphetamine). The judgment of the circuit court was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial. 

T.L.B. v. State of Alabama (CR-2023-0514) – Judge Anderson – Reversed and Remanded

  • Facts: T.L.B. was convicted of multiple felonies in Morgan Circuit Court, including first-degree kidnapping, rape, sodomy, domestic violence, burglary, and violating a domestic-violence protection order. Throughout the pre-trial proceedings, T.L.B. had issues with three successively appointed attorneys, moving for their withdrawal and expressing dissatisfaction. On the first day of trial, T.L.B. represented himself pro se with his third appointed counsel serving as advisory counsel. T.L.B. explicitly stated he was not representing himself and that he had a right to an attorney. The record was silent regarding the proceedings where it was decided T.L.B. would proceed pro se. On the second day of trial, T.L.B. refused to return to court, and the judge appointed his advisory counsel to represent him for the remainder of the trial. 
  • Holding: The Court of Criminal Appeals found the issue of T.L.B. being forced to proceed pro se without an effective waiver of counsel to be determinative. The Court emphasized that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel and a corresponding right to waive counsel and proceed pro se, but the waiver must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Citing Faretta v. California, the Court noted the record must show the defendant was made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. The record did not demonstrate a valid waiver; T.L.B. insisted on his right to counsel and did not state he wished to represent himself. The trial court’s failure to conduct a proper Faretta hearing and ensure a valid waiver constituted reversible error. The judgments of conviction were reversed, and the case was remanded. 

Ex parte Terrell Demetrius Bailey (CR-2024-0635) (Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus) – Judge Cole – Petition Denied

  • Facts: Terrell Demetrius Bailey was charged with first-degree human trafficking and was denied bail by the Montgomery Circuit Court. The pretrial detention hearing was held on July 17, 2024, and the written order denying bail was filed on July 22, 2024. Bailey petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the order denying bail was untimely (issued more than 48 hours after the hearing, contrary to § 15-13-3(b)(8), Ala. Code 1975) and failed to provide written findings of fact and reasons for denial. 
  • Holding: The Court of Criminal Appeals denied Bailey’s petition.
    • Timeliness: The Court held that the 48-hour timing provision in § 15-13-3(b)(8) for issuing an order denying bail is directory, not mandatory and jurisdictional. Therefore, the circuit court did not lose its power to deny bail even though the order was issued more than 48 hours after the hearing. The Court reasoned that the essence of “Aniah’s Law” and the corresponding statute is to empower courts to deny bail for certain serious offenses to protect the public, and a strict interpretation of the timing provision that divests the court of this power would thwart legislative purpose. Any error in the timing was harmless. 
    • Written Findings: The Court found that although the circuit court’s initial order was brief, the record of the pretrial detention hearing, including the testimony of two agents detailing the allegations of human trafficking, physical and sexual assault of a minor, and Bailey’s subsequent attempts to locate the victim, provided an unmistakable declaration of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for denying bail. The State had presented clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions would reasonably ensure Bailey’s appearance or protect community safety. Thus, a remand for more specific findings was not necessary. 

Ex parte Jefferson County Department of Human Resources (CR-2024-0326) (Petition for Writ of Mandamus) – Judge Cole – Petition Granted

  • Facts: The Jefferson County Department of Human Resources (DHR) challenged an order from the Chilton Juvenile Court requiring it to reimburse the Chilton County Commission $85 per day for the detention of C.M., a juvenile, pending adjudication of delinquency charges. C.M. had been placed in the Montgomery County Detention Facility after a delinquency petition was filed alleging she shoved a teacher. The juvenile court found C.M. had no suitable guardian and that her release would present a serious threat. Jefferson County DHR argued it was not financially responsible for these detention costs under Alabama law, that the county where the offense occurred (Chilton) was responsible, and that it was not a “parent” or “other person” legally obligated to pay under § 12-15-109, Ala. Code 1975. 
  • Holding: The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and instructed the juvenile court to vacate its reimbursement order.
    • The Court first determined it had jurisdiction because the reimbursement order arose from a delinquency proceeding. It also treated DHR’s appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus, as DHR was not a party to the underlying delinquency and the order was interlocutory. 
    • On the merits, the Court held that, under § 12-15-108(a), Ala. Code 1975, all expenses for the maintenance and care of children under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction are generally the responsibility of the county where the child is adjudicated or, if not adjudicated, where the petition is filed (here, Chilton County). DHR is a state agency, not a county, and § 12-15-109 (allowing courts to order parents or other legally obligated persons to pay) does not apply to DHR in this context merely because it had prior custody. The juvenile court acted beyond its authority in ordering Jefferson County DHR to reimburse Chilton County for pre-adjudication detention costs. 

Herman Clifford Hall v. State of Alabama (CR-2023-0837) – Judge Cole – Reversed and Remanded

  • Facts: Herman Clifford Hall was indicted for attempted murder after stabbing Lorenzo Hines during an altercation at a polling place where Hines was volunteering. The dispute began when Hall questioned Hines’s fraternity membership. Hall stabbed Hines in the leg and stomach. Hines’s abdominal wound was approximately 7 centimeters long but did not penetrate the abdominal wall fascia or peritoneal cavity; it was closed with stitches, and he was discharged the same day. Hall claimed self-defense. The jury found Hall guilty of the lesser-included offense of first-degree assault. 
  • Holding: The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Hall’s conviction for first-degree assault and remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of guilty for the lesser-included offense of second-degree assault and to resentence him accordingly.
    • The Court found the evidence insufficient to support a conviction for first-degree assault because the State failed to prove Hines suffered a “serious physical injury” as defined by § 13A-1-2(14), Ala. Code 1975 (requiring substantial risk of death, serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health, or protracted loss/impairment of a bodily organ function). While Hines’s injuries required medical attention, the evidence (including that the abdominal wound was superficial and did not penetrate the fascia, required only stitches, and he was cleared for work two days later) did not meet the statutory threshold for “serious physical injury.” 
    • However, the Court found the evidence was sufficient to establish all elements of second-degree assault, including causing “physical injury” (impairment of physical condition or substantial pain) by means of a deadly weapon. 

J.M.M. v. State of Alabama & A.E.M. v. State of Alabama (CR-2024-0086 & CR-2024-0157) – Judge Kellum – Affirmed as to Conviction; Remanded with Instructions to Correct Sentencing Order

  • Facts: J.M.M. and A.E.M. (husband and wife) were convicted of aggravated child abuse of their 18-month-old foster child, B.N. Evidence showed B.N. was hospitalized with numerous severe injuries, including a subdural hematoma, skull fracture, recently broken femur and radius, bald spots from hair pulling, and extensive bruising over her body, inconsistent with accidental causes. Medical testimony described it as one of the “worse case[s] of non-fatal abuse.” Text messages between J.M.M. and A.E.M. revealed their dislike for B.N., discussions about her bruises, admissions to being “too physical,” and A.E.M. stating, “If she stays much longer I might kill her … I’m not kidding.” Their young son testified to hearing a “big bang” and crying from the bathroom where B.N. was with her parents before A.E.M. called 911. 
  • Holding: The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions for aggravated child abuse.
    • The Court found the evidence more than sufficient to establish a prima facie case of aggravated child abuse under § 26-15-3.1(b)(1) (causing serious physical injury to a child under six by a responsible person). The jury was properly instructed on accomplice liability, and there was a plethora of evidence that J.M.M. and A.E.M. acted jointly. 
    • The Court rejected the argument that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on third-degree assault as a lesser-included offense. Given the extensive, severe, and patterned nature of B.N.’s injuries over time, rather than a single incident, there was no rational basis for a verdict of only third-degree assault; the defendants were guilty of aggravated child abuse or no crime at all. 
    • But the Court remanded for the circuit court to set aside a portion of its sentencing order regarding restitution for expert witness fees, as the State conceded this was improper and the circuit court had already indicated its intent to modify this. The sentences of life imprisonment were otherwise upheld as not an abuse of discretion given the horrific nature of the abuse. 

T.A.A., Jr. v. State of Alabama (CR-2024-0056) – Presiding Judge Windom – Reversed and Remanded on Return to Remand

  • Facts: T.A.A., Jr. appealed his guilty-plea convictions for 14 offenses, including production of obscene matter involving a minor and sexual abuse of a child. The plea agreement covered all 14 charges. On original submission, the Court of Criminal Appeals found several sentences illegal because they lacked the mandatory 10-year post-release supervision required by § 13A-5-6(c) for Class A felony sex offenses involving a child. On remand, the circuit court added the post-release supervision terms. T.A.A. then moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing it was involuntary because he was unaware of this additional penalty. The circuit court denied his motion to withdraw, finding his claim unpersuasive given his law enforcement background. T.A.A. then argued on return to remand that the circuit court could not partially enforce the plea agreement (by adding supervision) while denying his withdrawal, effectively severing the plea. 
  • Holding: The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgments of conviction and remanded with directions to set aside T.A.A.’s guilty pleas. The Court agreed with T.A.A.’s argument that the circuit court could not sever his guilty plea. Because T.A.A. had negotiated a single plea agreement covering all 14 charges, and the circuit court accepted the pleas in a single proceeding, it was the intent of the parties to enter into a single “package” plea agreement. When a material part of the plea agreement (the original sentences without mandatory supervision) was found to be invalid, the entire agreement was affected. The circuit court could not enforce parts of it while fundamentally altering another (by adding mandatory supervision over T.A.A.’s objection and refusal to affirm the plea under the new terms). The proper remedy was to allow withdrawal of the entire plea. 

Steven Richard Mulkey v. State of Alabama (CR-2023-0304) – Presiding Judge Windom – Affirmed

  • Facts: Steven Richard Mulkey was convicted of capital murder for intentionally killing Siu Mei Kao and Ching Kao by one act or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct. The Kaos, an elderly couple who owned a motel, had hired Mulkey for odd jobs. Surveillance footage showed Mulkey arguing with the Kaos in their motel office, then striking them with a hammer and slashing Siu Mei Kao’s neck with a knife. He later returned to move their bodies and their safe. Mulkey testified he “blacked out” after an argument over payment and after ingesting cocaine laced with methamphetamine. The jury unanimously sentenced him to death. 
  • Holding: The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Mulkey’s capital-murder conviction and death sentence.
    • Restraints during Penalty Phase: The Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to have Mulkey visibly restrained during the penalty phase. While defendants generally have a right to appear without restraints, Mulkey waived this right through his conduct, which included threats against court personnel and counsel, being found with a shank, and becoming combative with deputies after the guilt-phase verdict. 
    • Manslaughter Instruction (Voluntary Intoxication): The Court found no plain error in the trial court’s failure to sua sponte instruct on manslaughter due to voluntary intoxication as a lesser-included offense. Although Mulkey testified to drug use, the jury received a comprehensive instruction on how intoxication could negate specific intent and still found him guilty of capital murder. His self-serving statements about intoxication were inconsistent with the methodical nature of the crime shown on video. 
    • Intellectual Disability (Atkins Claim): The Court found no error in the denial of Mulkey’s Atkins motion claiming intellectual disability. Mulkey offered no evidence at the Atkins hearing, and penalty-phase evidence, while mentioning a low-average IQ (72) and developmental delays, did not establish significant subaverage intellectual functioning and significant deficits in adaptive behavior manifesting before age 18, as required. 
    • Jury Verdict as “Recommendation”: The Court found no plain error in the trial court’s references to the jury’s penalty-phase verdict as a “recommendation.” Despite these references, the jury was also informed that its verdict was binding, and the overall context did not mislead the jury about its role. 
    • Other issues raised by Mulkey, including alleged prosecutorial misconduct, admission of surveillance footage, and constitutionality of the death penalty for severe mental illness, were also found to be without merit or not rising to the level of plain error. The Court conducted its mandatory review and found the death sentence was not excessive or disproportionate. 

Disclaimer: This blog post is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. The summaries are brief and may not capture all nuances of the opinions. Attorneys should consult the full opinions for a complete understanding.

What are your thoughts on these decisions? Do any particular holdings stand out to you or raise further questions in your practice? Please share your comments and questions below!

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